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THE CASE AGAINST IMPOUNDMENT*
By Richard Adley Salomon**
The 1970's have witnessed a major expansion in the number and
scope of impoundments of congressionally appropriated funds by the
federal executive.' During the Nixon administration funds were no
longer frozen merely to effect marginal savings, control the rate of fund
allotment, or restrict the achievement of particular projects, as in earlier
practice,' but rather to alter the actual purpose of congressional pro-
grams. Policy impoundment, as Senator Humphrey noted, "is a
method of substituting Executive will for Congressional purpose." s
Recent exercises of executive power have thus tended to "relegate
distinctions and limits accepted by past decades to oblivion. .. .
The effects have been substantial, particularly as a result of actions by
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the clearinghouse for
executive budgetary decisionmaking. As part of President Nixon's Re-
organization Plan No. 2 (1970), OMB was established as the successor
to the Bureau of the Budget (BOB)5 and was charged with budgetary
responsibilities substantially broader than those discharged by BOB.
OMB's powers have grown to the point where one member of Congress
has remarked, "[t]he OMB has become the 'invisible government' of
the United States."06 Long-term as well as short-term projects which
* This note is expanded from an essay awarded the Harold E. Goettler Political
Institutions Prize, University of Chicago, 1974.
** Research assistant, the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of
Chicago Law School.
1. The impoundments discussed herein are those exercised with respect to funds
appropriated for domestic purposes. Whether the impoundment of funds appropriated
for national defense is authorized by the commander-in-chief clause of the Constitution
is a subject best dealt with separately.
2. See generally the incremental development scheme for impoundment set forth
by Professor Cooper in Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds Be-
fore the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 181-89 (1971) (hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings). (pre-
pared statement of Professor Joseph Cooper, "Executive Impoundment of Appropria-
tions").
3. 54 CoNG. DIGEsr (Apr., 1973) 119.
4. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 177. (testimony of Professor Cooper).
5. Exec. Order No. 11,541, 3 C.F.R. 939 (1966-70 Comp.).
6. 31 CONG. Q. Wk/. REPT. 215 (Feb. 3, 1973) (statement of Rep. J.J. Pickle of
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never before encountered difficulty in funding were put in jeopardy.
Entire programs were terminated or dismantled by the executive
branch: the Rural Environmental Assistance Program,7 the Farmers
Home Administration's Water and Sewer Grant Programs,8 Public
Housing construction subsidies (for low rent projects), 9 and the
Office of Economic Opportunity, including its various subprograms--
the Community Action Agencies, Senior Citizen Services, and Emer-
gency Food and Medical Programs.' 0
Gerald Ford, while still in the House of Representatives, sup-
ported many of these actions," recognizing the need "to give some
overall responsibility to a President" in the area of budgetary policy.'"
More recently, however, President Ford in a congressional message
noted that it is -the function of Congress to act as "a full patrner in the
continuing struggle to keep Federal spending under control."'
8
Whatever the course of the future, the interrelation of authorities
claimed by the executive branch for past impoundments is clear: the
"executive power" and "laws be faithfully executed" clauses of the
Texas). Among the functions of the Office of Management and Budget are:
"To assist the President in the preparation of the budget and the formulation of
the fiscal program of the Government.
' To supervise and control the administration of the budget.
'To keep the President informed of the progress of activities by agencies of the
Government with respect to work proposed, work actually initiated, and work completed.
7. See Joint Hearings on S.373 Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Impound-
ment of Funds of the Senate Committee on Government Operations and the Subcommit-
tee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. at 935 (1973) (hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings) (complaint for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief re: Termination of the Rural Environmental Assistance
Program).
8. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 161 (letter from Maine Commissioner of
Environmental Protection to Senator Muskie re: Termination of Water and Sewer Grant
Programs).
9. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 302-07 (testimony of Lewis Cenker, Vice
President of the National Association of Home Builders).
10. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 765-71 (memorandum by the Office of
Economic Opportunity on Section 221 Funding).
11. Evidenced by Mr. Ford's support of rural electrification and environmental as-
sistance program impoundments by the Nixon administration. See Hearings on the
Nomination of Gerald R. Ford of Mchigan to be Vice President of the United States
before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 74-
75 (1973). In addition, Congressman Ford in July, 1973, voted against a bill which
would circumscribe the president's powers to impound funds appropriated by Congress.
A revised version of this bill was later attached to the budget reform legislation and en-
acted into law. See note 47 infra.
12. Id. at 45.
13. The Presidents Message to the Congress Transmitting Deferrals and Re-
scissions, 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. at 1173 (Sept. 20, 1974).
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Constitution; statutory grants of spending discretion to the executive;
rigid spending ceilings and public debt limits; and finally, the generally
permissive intent of appropriation bills.14  This note will analyze these
arguments.
I. Constitutional Arguments
The only constitutional references to the power to spend are in
article I, which defines the duties of Congress. Article I, section 9
states that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Con-
sequence of Appropriations made by Law."'15 According to Alexander
Hamilton, the design of the Constitution in this clause secures
these important ends: "that the purpose, limit, and the fund of every
expenditure should be ascertained by a previous law. The public se-
curity is complete in this particular, if no money can be expended, but
for an object, to an extent, and out of a fund which the laws have pre-
scribed."'0  Moreover, by adding section 8 of article I, which gives
Congress the power to "provide for . . .general Welfare"' 7 and "to
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
14. For the purpose of this discussion, an appropriation statute will be defined as
general budgetary authority; the authorization act underlying the appropriation will be
presupposed. Although in a strict sense, the obligational authority for a program is a
separate step in the federal spending process from the allotment of funds, it has gener-
ally not been so regarded. For example, in the Antideficiency Act, the term "appropria-
tion" is taken to mean: "appropriations, funds, and authorizations to create obligations
by contract in advance of appropriations." 31 U.S.C. § 665(c) (1) (1970). Moreover,
in the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-36 (1970), Congress sought
to eliminate year-by-year planning by setting specific authorizations for the life of the
program. As Senator Ervin noted in his Brief as Amicus Curiae in State Highway
Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973): "In so doing, Congress in effect
transformed the authorization/obligation stage of the funding process into the equivalent
of the normal appropriation stage . . . "1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 979 (reprint
of Brief of Senator Ervin as Amicus Curiae).
15. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 9.
16. H. LODGE, 7 ALExANDER HAMILTON, WoRKs 86-87 (1885) (emphasis added).
Casper Weinberger, an administration spokesman for the existence of a broadly-con-
ferred presidential impoundment power, testifying in March, 1971, before the Senate
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, took a view diametrically opposed to that of
Hamilton-himself an advocate of broad presidential power. Citing the same provision
in section 9 of article I, that "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in con-
sequence of appropriations made by law," Weinberger concluded: "It does not follow
from this, however, that the expenditure of government funds involves an exclusively leg-
islative function; in fact, the provision I have just quoted seems to assume that the ex-
penditure of funds-as distinguished from the granting of authority to withdraw them
from the Treasury-is an executive function. In any event, it has always been so re-
garded." 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 94 (emphasis added) (testimony of C.W.
Weinberger, Deputy Director, OMB).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Execution the foregoing Powers",'8 a broad reading of the president's
power over spending is thereby precluded. 19
The executive branch, however, has interpreted the Constitution
in a different light. It has asserted that article I, section 1, which vests
the executive power in the president, encompasses the management of
the national budget and the preservation of the nation's fiscal integrity.
Therefore, the administration argues, the president has the authority
to refuse to spend funds, if necessary, to protect that fiscal integrity
and Congress may not mandate spending which jeopardizes it. One
administration theory asserts that the president has inherent "latitude"
to refuse to spend or to defer spending, regardless of congressional ac-
tion.2 ° Moreover, article II, section 3, which requires the president
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"'" has been cited as
a justification for impoundment. The rationale is that since the imple-
mentation of the laws, under the aforementioned clause, is an executive
responsibility, the president may enforce or not enforce legislation as
he sees fit.
22
Both these interpretations ignore the traditional separation of
18. Id.
19. The late Professor Alexander Bickel has noted that the president's power over
spending is no greater than his power over laws generally. 1971 Hearings, supra note
2, at 143-44 (statement made during testimony of C.W. Weinberger).
20. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 1090 (reprint of New York Times article
by James Naughton, February 11, 1973, Nixon's Challenge-Strugle Over The Power
of The Purse-(paraphrasing Deputy Attorney General Sneed).
The argument that there is an inherent constitutional right to impound is weakened
even by administration spokesmen. The fact that Deputy Attorney General Sneed (cur-
rently circuit court judge for the Ninth Circuit) and former Deputy Director of OMB
Weinberger (currently secretary of HEW) rely on congressional acquiescence as an im-
portant element in justifying administration policy is a tacit admission that contrary con-
gressional action would be significant. If the administration truly believes that there
is an indisputable inherent impoundment power, congressional acquiescence should be
considered irrelevant to their argument. For the congressional acquiescence argument,
see 1973 Hearings, supra note 7 at 833, 842 (Department of Justice answers to ques-
tions posed by Senator Ervin in his letter of February 14, 1973, to the deputy attorney
general) (hereinafter cited as Dept. of Justice answers). Deputy Attorney General
Sneed in his reply to Senator Ervin states, with respect to impoundment: "In my judg-
ment the warrant of historic practice is perhaps the strongest support for my position."
Id. at 842. See also 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 367 (prepared statement of Deputy
Attorney General Sneed); 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 162-63 (testimony of C.W.
Weinberger).
21. U.S. CoNsT. art. 11, § 3.
22. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 372-73 (testimony of Deputy Attorney
General Sneed). The foundation of this argument rests on the contention that the pres-
ident must harmonize inconsistent statutes. By claiming that the Antideficiency Act,
the Economic Stabilization Act, et al., represent statutes of overriding importance, the
president thus defends his impoundment practice. Specific statutory authorizations are
dealt with in another part of this article, see text accompanying notes 68-152 infra.
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powers framework provided by the Constitution. Justice Brandeis ob-
served in the 1920's that in a system of separated branches exercising
limited powers, virtually every delegation of power to one is con-
strained by the grant of power to another.23  Thus, the notion that the
Constitution confers discretionary power upon the executive to refuse
to execute a valid enactment by Congress "runs contrary to the entire
scheme of the Constitution. 24
The opinions of legal advisors to past presidents supports this
view. In 1899, for example, Attorney General Griggs advised the
secretary of the treasury that he had no authority to refuse to pay a
claim based on a private bill passed by Congress.26 In an unpublished
opinion letter of May 27, 1937, Attorney General Cummings advised
President Roosevelt that he had no power to refuse to spend appropri-
ated funds unless such power was found or implied in the legislation
itself.27  More recently, former Assistant Attorney General William H.
Rehnquist, in a memorandum to President Nixon's deputy counsel, Ed-
ward Morgan, concluded that the president does not have a constitu-
tional right to impound school-aid funds in the face of a congressional
directive that they be spent. Mr. Rehnquist stated:
It is in our view extremely difficult to formulate a constitutional
theory to justify a refusal by the President to comply with a Con-
gressional directive to spend. . . . [I]t seems an anomalous propo-
sition that because the Executive branch is bound to execute the
laws, it is free to decline to execute them.
28
23. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 292-295 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
24. 31 CONa. Q. WK. REPT. 215 (Feb. 3, 1973) (excerpt from Brief of Senator
Ervin as Amicus Curiae in State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.
1973).
25. Although Acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark in a 1967 letter to the secre-
tary of transportation defended the president's authority to impound federal-aid highway
funds, he was primarily concerned with statutory construction. As Assistant Attorney
General Rehnquist pointed out in a 1969 memorandum, "[t]his opinion [of Acting At-
torney General Clark] appears to us to have been based on the construction of the par-
ticular statute, rather than on the assertion of a broad constitution principle of Execu-
tive authority." 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 279, 283 (reprint of 1969 memoran-
duin by Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist re: Presidential Authority
to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally Impacted Schools) (herein-
after referred to as Rehnquist Memo).
26. 22 Op. Arr'y GEN. 295 (1900).
27. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 7, at 283 (Rehnquist Memo).
28. Id. See also Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1043, 1111-1115. Berger states: "It is a feat of splendid illogic to wring from
a duty faithfully to execute the laws a power to defy them." Id. at 1114. Moreover,
judicial opinion exists supporting the notion of execution cannot be extended beyond the
mere carrying out of enacted law. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952) (Black, J., majority opinion); id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., con-
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Indeed, once congressional policy becomes law, it is the presi-
dent's duty to execute it whether he agrees with it or not. The Su-
preme Court has accepted this interpretation. In Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, 29 the Supreme Court was asked to hold that it
was within the constitutional authority of the postmaster general, as an
official of the executive branch, to refuse to pay a contractor for service
rendered, notwithstanding that Congress, by private legislation, had
specifically provided for payment to the contractor. In refusing to so
rule, this early decision clearly established that when Congress has ex-
pressly directed that sums be spent, the president has no constitutional
power not to spend them:
It was urged at the bar, that the postmaster general was alone sub-
ject to the direction and control of the President, with respect to the
execution of the duty imposed upon him by this law, and this right
of -the President is claimed, as growing out of the obligation im-
posed upon him by the constitution, to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is a doctrine that cannot receive the sanc-
tion of this court. It would be vesting in the President a dispensing
power, which has no countenance for its support in any part of the
constitution; and is asserting a principle, which, if carried out in
its results, to all cases falling within it, would be clothing the Presi-
dent with a power entirely to control the legislation of congress, and
paralyze the administration of justice.
To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to
see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their ex-
ecution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely in-
admissible.80
In cases subsequent to Kendall, the Supreme Court has reiterated
its position: When Congress appropriates money through a private bill
to a particular person or group, no officer of the executive branch has
the discretion to refuse to make the payment. 31
The focus in Kendall and later cases is not on the nature of the
claim or the fact that it is private, but rather the force of the making
of a law. The situation in Kendall and the later cases is thereby analo-
gous in certain respects to the problem of impoundment; both involve
congressional enactments requiring a sum of money to be paid out and
refusal by the executive branch to carry out the will of the legislature.
curring); id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117
(1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 187 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 247, 292
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
30. Id. at 612-13 (emphasis added).
31. United States v. Louisville, 169 U.S. 249 (1898) (recovery of taxes by a city);
United States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885) (reimbursement for supplies taken from an
individual during war); United States v. Jordon, 113 U.S. 418 (1885) (refunding of ex-
cess taxes).
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Both situations would allow an executive official some degree of discre-
tion, but as the Supreme Court pointed out in the various cases the
president does not have the power to forbid the law's execution.
2
A differing thesis regarding the general power to impound has
been found in In re Neagle 3 There the president had ordered that
a federal deputy act as bodyguard for a justice of the Supreme Court
whose life had been threatened. In carrying out his duties he killed
an attacker and was arrested and charged by local officials. The Su-
preme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he had
been performing a duty within the president's power and therefore was
protected by the aegis of the federal government. As a source for this
power, the Supreme Court credited the duty to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. Thus the high court, in affirming the circuit
court's discharge of the defendant, implicitly noted that the president
has some inherent powers to do certain acts upon his own initiative.
Advocates of the impoundment practice have built upon this inter-
pretation to support their own cause. 4 Neagle, however, is distin-
guishable from the impoundment situation, for as the Neagle Court
pointed out, in that case there was no action by Congress, and this void
necessitated presidential power.35 In the impoundment of appropri-
ated funds, the entire conflict is focused upon the fact that there is a
contrary congressional enactment.3 6 Thus, although Neagle estab-
lished that the president had powers beyond the enforcement of acts
of Congress, it carries no weight in an area where Congress has acted.
Another case, In re Debs,3 7 has been cited to support the inherent
power of the chief executive to impound funds.38 Debs involved the
validity of an injunction sought by the executive to prevent obstruction
of the mails by certain strike activities. In sustaining the injunction,
the Court spoke of broad national powers over interstate commerce,
of national competence "to remove all obstructions upon highways, nat-
32. As the late Professor Bickel stated, Kendall, fordon, Price and Louisville es-
tablished that under some circumstances, the congressional will prevails over the execu-
tive's simple refusal to execute. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 48-9 (remarks of Pro-
fessor Bickel during testimony of Representative Charles Bennett of Florida).
33. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
34. Generally, officials of the executive branch have taken this position. See
1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 833, 839 (Dept. of Justice Answers). The viewpoint
also discussed in Goostree, The Power of the President to Impound Appropriated Funds:
With Special Reference to Grants-in-Aid to Segregated Activities, 11 Am. U.L. REv. 32,
41-42 (1962).
35. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-67 (1890).
36. See, e.g., recent anti-impoundment legislation, note 47 infra; mandated appro-
priations, note 48 infra.
37. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
38. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 833, 839 (Dept. of Justice Answers).
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ural, or artificial, to the passage of interstate commerce," and of the
competency of the executive branch forcibly to remove such obstruc-
tions by appeal to the courts."9  However, as in the case of Neagle,
Congress had not made its will known on the contested issue, there
being no direct congressional provision for securing such an injunc-
tion.
40
United States v. Midwest Oil Co. 41 has also been alleged to sup-
port a broad view of inherent executive power.42 The question raised
was whether -the president could transfer lands from the public domain
to a naval oil reserve, thereby removing them from eligibility for home-
stead or lease. 43 In upholding the president's action, the Court said:
[O]fficers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to
any long-continued action of the Executive Department--on the
presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed
to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice.
44
Considering that the Court's decision rests on -the two-fold proposition
of long-standing practice and congressional acquiescence, the Midwest
Oil case is simply not authoritative on the matter of inherent presiden-
tial power-including impounding power.45  Moreover, the argument
39. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895).
40. Oddly enough, although the executive does not cite a statute to sustain the in-
junction, the Debs Court, in the concluding paragraph of its opinion, reveals a congres-
sional act which the Court believes would uphold its power to grant the injunction.
Granting, arguendo, that there exists a pertinent congressional enactment, the bearing
of the Debs case on inherent power is clearly thrown into doubt. Moreover, applying
the standards established by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952), some fifty-seven years later,
the issue in Debs would fall within that category of presidential action which is consis-
tent with congressional will (see text accompanying note 61 infra).
If, however, one does not accept the proposition that there is a congressional provi-
sion to sustain the presidential action in Debs, one can still rely on the aforementioned
theory promulgated in Neagle, i.e., the absence of congressional intent necessitated presi-
dential power. 135 U.S. at 63-67.
41. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
42. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 833, 839 (Dept. of Justice Answers).
43. The president claimed that the lands were being bought up at such a rapid pace
that the president felt he could not wait for Congress to act. He expressly issued Ifis
order "[i]n aid of proposed legislation." 236 U.S. at 467.
44. Id. at 472-73. The Court found 282 examples of similar unprotested withdraw-
als over the previous fifty years. However, Justice Day, dissenting, differed with the
Court's opinion in finding that these 282 prior examples were indistinguishable categor-
ies and hence to precedent for the president's action. Id. at 492. See also The Floyd
Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 677 (1869):
"It may also be questioned whether the frequent exercise of a power unauthorized
by law, by officers of the government, can ever by its frequency be made to stand as
a just foundation for the very authority which is thus assumed."
45. See note 20 supra for the Nixon administration's argument regarding congres-
sional acquiescence.
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-that presidential impoundment power is derived from an implied con-
gressional grant, established by long, unbroken practice, falls short.
When Congress has asked with specificity, the Court has upheld such
legislation in the face of contrary presidential action.4 6 In the case of
impoundment Congress has implemented specific anti-impound legis-
lation4 7 to control domestic spending. In fact, Congress has utilized
mandatory language in various statutes for the expressed purpose of
depriving the executive branch of any discretionary power to with-
hold.
48
46. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Vital to
the majority's position was the existence of statutes enunciating the procedure that the
president was to follow in dealing with strikes which affected the national interest. id.
at 585-86, n.2. Justice Black, writing for the Court, maintained that in the face of such
statutes, the president could not act in a manner contrary to that dictated by Congress.
Id. at 586, 588-89.
47. In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Impoundment and Information Act,
Pun. L. No. 92-599, tit. IV, 86 Stat. 1325, as amended, Pui. L. No. 93-344, tit. X, 88
Stat. 332. It provided for the transmittal to the Congress and to the comptroller general
of the amount of the funds impounded, the date on which they were impounded, and
the reasons for impoundment.
More recently, Congress passed and the president signed into law the Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, PuB. L. No. 93-344, tit. X, 88 Stat. 332. This legislation 1)
amends the Antideficency Act to limit executive discretion (deletes "other develop-
ments" clause), id. at § 1002; 2) requires that rescissions proposed by the president ter-
minate within 45 days unless approved by both houses of Congress, id. at § 1012(b);
3) provides for deferrals requested by the president to cease if disapproved by either
the House or Senate, id. at § 1013(b); and 4) establishes an enforcement mechanism
by delegating authority to the comptroller general to file suits in the federal district court
on behalf of Congress, id. at § 1016. As of this writing, these procedures have not been
"tested"; however, it is worthy to note that on paper they represent a marked improve-
ment over previous congressional efforts to curb the impoundment practice.
48. Three examples of mandated appropriations statutes: Act of Sept. 30, 1950,
PuB. L. No. 81-874, ch. 1124, 64 Stat. 1100, (authorizing financial assistance for the
maintenance and operation of local school districts); Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,
23 U.S.C. §§ 101-36 (1970), as amended, 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-44 (1974 Supp.); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, PuB. L. No. 92-500, § 205(a), 86
Stat. 837.
With respect to Pun. L. No. 81-874, former Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist
interpreted the language of the statute:
"[jlmpounding the P.L. 874 funds would result. . . in permanent loss to the recipi-
ent school districts of the funds in question and defeat of the Congressional intent that
the operations of these districts be funded at a particular level for the fiscal year.
"While there have been instances in the past in which the President has refused
to spend funds appropriated by Congress for a particular purpose, we know of no such
instance involving a statute which by its terms sought to require such expenditure."
1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 283 (emphasis added) (Rehnquist Memo).
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 is equally clear in its language. An amend-
ment to the act, 23 U.S.C. 101(c) (1970), specifically addressed itself to the issue of
impoundment:
'It is the sense of Congress that under existing law no part of any sums authorized
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The case of Myers v. United States49 has been further relied upon
as support for a broad interpretation of the president's constitutional
powers. Myers involved the executive removal of an Oregon postmas-
ter. The Court, in upholding the president's action, 0 defined the ex-
ecutive removal power in expansive terms. However, the Court's deci-
sion was based upon a Hamiltonian construction of the "executive
power" clause of the Constitution: "The executive power was given
in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was
regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where
limitation was needed. . . ."51 The Court in the later removal cases,
namely Humphrey's Executor v. United States52 and Weiner v. United
States,5 has not applied this standard to the adjudication of the issues.
Indeed, it has significantly restricted the force of Myers. The Hum-
phrey's Executor and Weiner Courts disapproved of a presidential
hegemony over all manifestations of the law's administration, the view
taken in Myers.54 Instead, Humphrey's Executor and Weiner favored
the principle of congressional authority independent of executive con-
trol-in the creation of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial bodies.55 In
reaching its determination, the court in Humphrey's Executor made
to be appropriated for expenditure upon any Federal-aid system which has been appor-
tioned pursuant to the provisions of this title shall be impounded or withheld....
(emphasis added).
Moreover, in State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973), the
court declared that Congress "provided for a coherent scheme of statutory duties relating
to the Secretary of Transportation." Id. at 1112. In citing the Federal-Aid Highway
Act, the court held that the discretion over the approval of grants to local highway au-
thorities was closely circumscribed by "specific directions relating to efficiency, safety,
and overall compliance with the Act itself." Id.
Finally, Section 205 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 contains mandatory language. It states relevant part: "(a) Sums authorized to
be appropriated. . . shall be allotted by the Administrator [by a given date] . . . (b) (1)
Any sums allotted to a State under subsection (a) shall be available for obligation...
on and after the date of such allotment." A federal district court recently held the im-
poundment of $6 billion in funds, provided by the act, unwarranted and ordered their
release. City of New York v. RuckeIshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), a!fd sub.
nom. 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974) (No. 1377,
1973 term).
49. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
50. The removal actually was by order of the postmaster general; however, he was
acting under the direction of the president. Id. at 106.
51. Id. at 118. This passage is cited by Deputy Attorney General Sneed as au-
thority for the president's impounding actions. 1973 Hearings, sttpra note 7, at 833,
839. (Dept. of Justice Answers).
52. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
53. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
54. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
55. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. at 629; Weiner v, United
States, 357 U.4- t 352,
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specific mention of the Myers opinion:
To support its contention that the removal provision .. . as we
have construed it, is an unconstitutional interference with the
executive power of the President, the government's chief reliance
is Myers v. United States .... In the course of the opinion of
the [Myers] court, expressions occur which tend to sustain the gov-
ernment's contention, but these are beyond the point involved and,
therefore, do not come within the rule of stare decisis. In so far
as they are out of harmony with the views here set forth, these ex-
pressions are disapproved.56
Clearly, the administration's case for inherent presidential power, as set
forth in Myers, must be reviewed in the light of the later Courts' rul-
ings.
Finally, the nature and scope of presidential power was tested in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.57 Faced with the threat of
a steel strike damaging to the national defense, President Truman
ordered that the steel mills be seized and operated by the secretary
of commerce. The only basis of authority claimed for such action was
the general constitutional powers of the president. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument. It found that the steel seizure not only
challenged the legislative realm, but violated the intent of Congress.5"
Justice Black spoke for the Court: "In the framework of our Con-
stitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully exe-
cuted refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."59 In concurring,
Justice Frankfurter noted that "[wihen Congress itself has struck the
balance, has defined the weight to be given the competing interests,
a court of equity is not justified in ignoring that pronouncement.
"60
The standards established by Justice Jackson, in-his concurring
opinion, cast further doubt on the presidential argument of inherent au-
thority to impound funds. Justice Jackson lists three situations where
"a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers":
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied au-
thorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it in-
cludes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
56. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added).
57. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
58. Id. at 586-88. During consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress rejected
an amendment which would have authorized government seizures in such cases of emer-
gency. Id. at 586.
59. Id. at 587. Moreover, "[tihe Constitution does not subject this lawmaking
power of Congress to presidential ... supervision or control." Id. at 588.
60, 14, 4t 609-10 (Frankfurter, J., conwcrring).
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grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own inde-
pendent powers ...
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can
sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disa-
bling the Congress from acting upon the subject. 61
Justice Jackson placed the steel seizure case in the third category,
where presidential power is at its "lowest ebb." Impoundment, like-
wise, falls in that area where the president is most vulnerable to attack
and in the least favorable of constitutional postures. Having taken a
measure incompatible with the expressed will of Congress, his constitu-
tional authority is limited.62 The power to impound thereby "must be
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium estab-
lished by our constitutional system. '63
The argument that the president possesses inherent authority to
impound funds appropriated by Congress has an overriding difficulty-
such authority would be unlimited. The power of Congress to es-
tablish policies and fix priorities (which includes the power to provide
funds for programs) is of course subject to a limited overridable presi-
dential veto.64 But an absolute power to impound wxould be a severe
incursion on this power to make law. It would convert the qualified
veto into an absolute veto over funding programs 65 and thus would ren-
61. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
62. Recent impoundment cases have applied the doctrine of congressional intent
in rejecting executive constitutional and statutory arguments to withhold. See, e.g., City
of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom. 494 F.2d
1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974) (No. 1377, 1973 Term)
(water pollution funds); Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689
(E.D. Va. 1973), modified sub nom., 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94
S. Ct. 1991 (1974) (No. 1378, 1973 term) (water pollution funds); State Highway
Comm'n v. Volpe, 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972), modified, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th
Cir. 1973) (impoundment of highway trust funds); Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Em-
ployees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973) (termination of community action
agencies); Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973) (emergency agricultural
loans).
Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972) has been cited in
support of the impoundment practice. The court in reaching its determination utilized
the congressional intent standard; it found the statutory language to be nonmandatoty,
thus granting discretion to the executive. Id. at 656. For a complete list of cases, see
Court Cases on Impoundment of Funds: A Public Policy Analysis, LMR. OF CONG.,
LEG. REFFR. SERV. (1974).
63. 343 U.S. at 638.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
65. The absolute veto power would destroy a fundamental principle of American
constitutional law, i.e., that there is no officer, "from the President down to the most
subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and
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der congressional action in the important area of spending policy deter-
mination merely advisory or prohibitory.6
The faithful execution clause, the veto provisions, the necessary
and proper clause, and finally the attorney generals' opinions, are all
supportive of a constitutional principle that the executive branch is con-
tinuously under an obligation of execution with respect to enacted law.
That is, when Congress makes a law which the president later refuses
to effectuate within the legislatively prescribed bounds, -the president
is setting himself against this constitutionally imposed duty. Moreover,
little support can be gleaned from the cases cited by the administra-
tion-Neagle, Debs, Midwest Oil and Myers-to overcome this pre-
sumption. With regard to the theory that the chief executive has a con-
limited authority." The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 677 (1869). Nor
is an item veto acceptable. It would grant the president the right to veto a portion of
a bill, but sign the remainder. The Constitution, however, makes it clear that the presi-
dent must agree to the entire bill or veto it entirely. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
With respect to the history of the veto power, Professor Philip B. Kurland in the
1973 hearings noted, "the records of the Convention make it quite clear that the Found-
ing Fathers were quite concerned about Executive power, that there was some concern
as to whether they wanted to permit the veto at all, that they did permit the veto only
on the specified conditions that are contained in article I, section 7." 1973 Hearings,
supra note 7, at 400 (remarks of Professor Kurland to the testimony of Deputy Attorney
General Sneed). Kurland goes on to say, ". . . they [the founding fathers] anticipated
a limited authority in the president to preclude the effectuation of national legislation."
Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
66. Senator Ervin remarked on this point: "The impoundment practice . . .
places Congress in the paradoxical and belittling position of having to lobby the Execu-
tive to carry out the laws it has passed." 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 3 (introduc-
tory remarks of Senator Ervin).
Congress, in fact, was acutely aware of the repercussions of an absolute presidential
veto: in 1972 President Nixon impounded $6 billion in water pollution funds, appropri-
ated by Congress pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972,
Pun. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 837. In refusing to release the funds, the president ignored
the congressional override of his veto to the aforementioned Water Pollution Act amend-
ments; thereby, Congress was left with no means to implement the legislation it had
passed.
This point was tellingly made in a dialogue between Senator Muskie and Deputy
Attorney General Sneed:
Senator Muskie: Now, let me ask you this question: We allotted $11 billion
in 2 years, $5 billion the first year [in water pollution funds]. The President
has cut that in half. Now, could the President or could the Administrator, in
your judgment, change administration policy and now allow the sums that were
not allotted prior to January 1?
Mr. Sneed: Senator, I am not prepared to answer that. I would have to study
the act to a greater extent to be able to give you a complete answer.
I can see that there is a basis for, I think, the position you are pointing
toward, and that is, I think it is not available.
Senator Muskie: If that is the case, and I believe it to be, then what the Presi-
dent has done is not delayed the spending of these sums, nor delayed the allot-
ment of these funds, but rewritten a bill that the Congress enacted over his
veto by cutting the authorized amounts in half.
Now that is a legislative function, in my view.
1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 375-76 (emphasis added).
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stitutional pdwer to decline to spend funds appropriated by Congress,
it must be concluded that "the existence of such a broad power is sup-
ported neither by reason nor precedent."167
H. Statutory Authorization
As previously mentioned, current impoundments have been ra-
tionalized by the assertion that it is the president's duty to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 8 Although this claim rests on
a clause of the Constitution, the argument is fundamentally based on
the construction of various statutes. The proponents of the administra-
tion theory maintain that despite the mandate that may appear from
a particular appropriation act,69 there exist conflicting statutes which
confer discretion upon the president in this regard .7  Citing -the Anti-
deficiency Act,7 1 the Employment Act of 1946,72 the Economic Stabili-
zation Act of 1970,73 the statutory spending ceiling,74 and the public
debt limit,75 'they argue that the president has the responsibility to ex-
ecute all the laws. Since Congress has sent out contradictory signals,
the president, in order to harmonize them, must have the freedom to
withhold funds from federal programs.
76
67. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at (Rehnquist Memo).
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
69. While the administration has admitted that mandated appropriation acts exist,
see 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 364, 368 (prepared statement of Deputy Attorney
General Sneed), it has also contended that appropriation acts are generally permissive,
1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 94 (testimony of C.W. Weinberger): 1973 Hearings,
supra note 7, at 367-68 (prepared statement of Deputy Attorney General Sneed). For
a more extensive commentary on the 'permissiveness' argument, see text accompanying
notes 153-75 infra.
70. Former Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist noted with respect to conflicting
statutory demands: "mhe conflict must be real and imminent for this argument to have
validity. . . ." 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 284 (Rehnquist Memo).
71. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, PuB. L. No. 58-217 ch. 1484, § 4. 33 Stat. 1257; Act
of Feb. 27, 1906, PuB. L. No. 59-28 ch. 510, § 3, 34 Stat. 48; Act of Sept. 6, 1950,
PuB. L. No. 81-759 ch. 896, § 1211, 64 Stat. 765; codified in 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)
(1970), as amended, PuB. L. No. 93-344, tit. X, § 1002, 88 Stat. 332.
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1026 (Supp.
1974).
73. PuB. L, No. 91-379, tit. 11, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, PUB. L. No. 92-210, 85
Stat. 743, as amended, PuB. L. No. 93-28, 87 Stat. 27.
74. Act of Dec. 18, 1967, PuB. L. No. 90-218, §§ 201-06, 81 Stat. 662; Revenue
and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pur. L. No. 90-364, § 202, 82 Stat. 271; Second
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1969, PuB. L. No. 91-47, § 401, 83 Stat. 82; Second
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1970, PuB. L. No. 91-305, §§ 401, 501, 84 Stat. 405.
75. 31 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1970), as temporarily amended, PutB. L. No. 93-173, 87
Stat. 691.
76. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 94-97 (testimony of C.W. Weinberger);





The Antideficiency Acts of 1905 and 190677 provided that the
president should apportion monies to prevent over-expenditure. 78 Any
waiver or modification of the apportionment plan was to be reported
to Congress. The 1906 amended version stated specifically that the
waiver or modification should only take place "upon the happening of
some extraordinary emergency or unusual circumstance which could
not be anticipated at the time" 79 the appropriation was made. Al-
though the act contemplated apportionment by the heads of executive
agencies, the creation of the Bureau of the Budget in 1921 resulted
in more centralized control of the apportionment process.80 The bud-
get bureau directed that reserve funds be established not only to pre-
vent overexpenditure, but to effect savings. However, such savings
were made without in any way hindering "the accomplishment of the
objects of legislation."8"
In 1950 the Antideficiency Act was amended by the General Ap-
propriation Act, 2 after the budget bureau sought firmer statutory sup-
port for its policies.8 3  This statute has been cited frequently by the
77. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1257; Act of Feb. 27, 1906, ch.
510, § 3, 34 Stat. 48.
78. That is, an undue expenditure in one part of the year.
79. 34 Stat. 49.
80. Up until the 1930's, the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) had little decision mak-
ing power over spending; it could pressure and exhort, but it could not direct or com-
mand the allotment of funds. Beginning in 1933, the bureau's responsibilities were
broadened. In that year, President Roosevelt, by executive order, gave the BOB the
function of "making, waiving, and modifying apportionments of appropriations." Exec.
Order No. 6,166 (1933). By transferring significant authority from the department
or agency hands to the bureau, steps were taken to centralize the apportionment process.
In addition, a 1939 Roosevelt directive removed the bureau from the treasury, placing
it in the newly-created Executive Office of the President. This general strengthening
of the BOB in the pre-World War II period provided a key foundation for the later ex-
pansion of the withholding power (the role of the OMB in the seventies).
81. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 178 (statement of Professor Cooper, quoting
Charles Dawes, first director of the BOB).
82. 64 Stat. 765.
83. During World War 11, the Roosevelt administration reduced certain types of
spending to offset increased military expenditures. For example, in 1942 President
Roosevelt informed Congress that: "Federal aid for highways will be expended only for
construction essential for strategic purposes. Other highway projects will be deferred
until the post-war period." 88 CONG. REc. 38 (1942). The commander-in-chief clause
of the Constitution was cited as justification for these actions.
When the war ended, however, the deferred funds were still not released. As time
went on, it appeared that the budget bureau, now under the helmsmanship of President
Truman, would continue the limited funding policy of the Roosevelt administration.
With the war over, Truman found it difficult to rationalize his actions on the basis of
Roosevelt's argument. The BOB thus sought to obtain statutory authorization to sustain
executive actions.
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Nixon administration to justify impoundment practices.8 4  The
1950 act provides for the establishment of reserves to deal with "con-
tingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings are made possible by
or through changes in requirements, greater efficiency of operations,
or other developments subsequent to the date on which such appropri-
ation was made available."s
The language as well as the legislative history of the amended An-
tideficiency Act precludes the establishment of reserves simply because
of policy disagreements between the executive and Congress. 6 The
power ,to effect savings is limited to changes in requirements due to
events occurring after the appropriation was made; thereby, the substi-
tution of the executive's judgment on the same facts is prohibited. 7
Moreover, the provision contemplates only savings made possible by
changes and developments intrinsic to the program itself. The specific
wording of the statute, in defining the duties of the apportioning of-
ficer,8 sets the bounds: "Whenever it is determined . . . that any
amount will not be required to carry out the purposes of the appropria-
tion concerned, he [the apportioning officer] shall recommend the re-
scission of such amount .. "89 As Comptroller General Staats
noted, testifying before the Senate Ad Hoe Committee on Impound-
ment of Funds in 1973: "Ilhe act would not appear to authorize
reservations based upon considerations of overall economy in govern-
ment or other circumstances which do not relate directly to particular
appropriations, and which would have the effect of reordering priorities
It was in this light that the General Appropriation Act was passed in 1950. See
Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15 AD. Sci. Q. 361, 362-63 (1970) reprinted
in 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 103; J. Williams, The Impoundlag of Funds by the
Bureau of the Budget, ICP Case Series No. 28, 1955, reprinted in 1971 Hearings, supra
note 2, at 378, 392-93.
84. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 95 (statement of C.W. Weinberger); 1973
Hearings, supra note 7, at 366 (prepared statement of Deputy Attorney General Sneed).
85. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c) (2) (1970). The "other developments" clause was stricken
in the recently passed budget reform/impoundment control legislation (see note 47
supra) because of the vast discretion it provided the executive branch.
86. See H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1950); Ramsey, Impoundment
By The Executive Department of Funds Which Congress Has Authorized It To Spend
Or Obligate, LiBR. OF CoNG. LEG. REF. SERv., 1968, at 11; see also 89 CoNG. REc.
10362-63 (1943) (remarks of Senator Harry Truman).
87. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970), referred to in 1973 Hearings, supra note 7,
at 105, 109-110 (attachment to the statement of Comptroller General Staats).
88. Formerly the director of the BOB served this function; however, since Presi-
dent Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 2 (1970), which transferred the responsibilities
of the BOB to the OMB, the director of the OMB performs the task of "apportioning
officer."
89. 31 U.S.C. 665(c) (2) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-344, tit. X, § 1002,
88 Stat. 332.
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determined by the Congress." °  The test of any impoundment under
the act, therefore, is dependent upon the capacity of the executive to
carry out the purposes of the appropriation.
The legislative history of the 1950 General Appropriation Act bol-
sters this narrow reading of the impoundment power therein granted.
The Bureau of the Budget, in a 1947 report, which significantly influ-
enced the construction of the general appropriation statute, pointed out
that authority "must be exercised with considerable care in order to
avoid usurping the powers of Congress." 91 The House Committee Re-
port that accompanied the act reiterated this concern for the preserva-
tion of legislative policy: "The administration officials responsible for
administration of an activity for which appropriation is made bear the
final burden for rendering all necessary service with the smallest
amount possible within the ceiling figure fixed by Congress. '92  The
report went so far as to state that "there is no warrant or justification
for the thwarting of a major policy of Congress by the impounding of
funds.
'93
Clearly, neither the language nor the legislative history of the
amended Antideficiency Act supports the claim that the president has
a broad discretionary power to impound.94 While Congress, in the act,
sought to give the executive branch managerial flexibility to provide
90. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 110 (attachment to statement of Comptroller
General Staats) (emphasis added). Similarly, the BOB, in a 1961 memorandum to
President Kennedy, applied a rigid interpretation to the statute:
"The language of the Act, when read in context, seems to indicate rather clearly
that the provisions permitting the establishing of reserves are to be used only to the ex-
tent that they do not interefere with the execution of the purposes of which appropria-
tions are provided." Id. at 338, 340 (memorandum to the president: Authority to Re-
duce Expenditures).
91. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 108 (attachment to statement of Comptroller
General Staats). This position was adopted in the Bureau of the Budget Examiner's
Handbook: "Reserves must not be used to nullify the intent of Congress with respect
to specific projects or level of programs." Id. at 844, 859 (reprint of Williams, The
Impounding of Funds by the Bureau of the Budget).
92. H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1950) (emphasis added). Before
passage of the General Appropriation Act, Congressman Mahon remarked: "I would
not object, as I know other Members would not object, to any reasonable economies in
Government. But economy is one thing, and the abandonment of a policy and program
of the Congress another thing." 95 CONG. REc. 14,922 (1949) (emphasis added).
93. H.R. RPp. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1950).
94. Indeed, Congress' purpose in passing the Antideficiency Act Amendments may,
in fact, have been to limit the use of impoundment for purposes consistent with the goals
of particular spending bills. See Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1505,
1518 n.69 (1973), wherein it is concluded that since the General Appropriation Act of
1950 was passed shortly after President Truman's impoundment of funds for increasing
the size of the air force, it may have been initiated to limit the president's spending dis-
cretion.
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for economies and contingencies, it did not comprehend reserves made
with the intent to thwart, modify or reduce congressional purpose.
B. Employment Act of 1946
The Employment Act of 194695 is another law utilized to justify
broad presidential impoundment authority. 96 The act gave official
sanction to Keynesian economic policy, formerly only tacitly accepted.
9
7
It declared that the federal government would henceforth assume the
burden of managing the national economy, in an effort to eliminate the
"boom-bust" syndrome of the past." The Nixon administration
broadly interpreted this act to give it extensive powers to cut spending
and thereby impound funds, to curb inflation.99
The portion of the employment act claimed as a foundation for
-the impoundment power reads:
[I]t is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Gov-
ernment to use all practicable means consistent with its needs and
obligations and other essential considerations of national policy
. . . to promote maximum employment, production, and purchas-
ing power.' 00
On reflection, the bearing this act has upon the matter of withholding
funds seems at best tenuous. First, the act is addressed to the "federal
government", not to the "executive". Nowhere in the statute is the
president given plenary power to act unilaterally in the fight against
inflation. Second, the administration argument of broad executive dis-
cretion is based upon the preamble to the employment act. The body
of the act, however, clearly provides the Congress with a substantial
role in promoting the economic policies of the country. Sections 1022
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1026 (1974 Supp.).
96. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 96 (testimony of C.W. Weinberger); 1973
Hearings, supra note 7, at 366 (prepared statement of Deputy Attorney General Sneed).
The Nixon administration also contended that the Employment Act of 1946 is a source
of conflicting congressional authority in the area of appropriations. 1971 Hearings,
supra note 2, at 96-7 (testimony of C.W. Weinberger).
97. R. HEILBRONER, THn MAKING OF ECONOMIC Soci-TY, 158-60 (1972).
98. Id. at 160.
99. The language of the Employment Act of 1946, "to promote maximum employ-
ment, production, and purchasing power," has also been interpreted to grant the presi-
dent broad power to expand spending rather than to impound funds, on the theory that
higher government spending will promote employment, production, and wages. 1971
Hearings, supra note 2, at 594, 596 (memorandum by Louis Fishzr to Senator Ervin,
April, 1971) (hereinafter referred to as Fisher memo). In fact, thi position was taken
by the Nixon administration on the supersonic transport: increased government expendi-
ture would provide more jobs. In response to this, Fisher asks: "But why are jobs as-
sociated with Model Cities, urban renewal, regional medical programs-and other pro-
grams affected by impoundment-of less importance? On what basis does the dminis-
tration make such decisions?" Id. at 596.
90, 15 U.S.C. § 1021 1970),
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and 1023 of the Employment Act of 1946 direct the president, with
the advice and assistance of the newly created Council of Economic
Advisors, to prepare a yearly economic report, which is to be submitted
to Congress. Section 1024 further established the Joint Economic
Committee in Congress. Third, under these same operative sections
of the act, the president is explicitly given limited control over policy:
the making of such recommendations for legislation as he may deem
necessary or desirable. 10 1
Even assuming that the requisite congressional intent could be
demonstrated, and that the employment act was accepted as a source
of additional presidential discretion in appropriation measures, it is
doubtful that it could be authority for specific program reservation., 0 2
Insofar as -the control of inflation can be construed in a purpose of the
employment act, it would seem that any reservations for such a purpose
would have to be made across-the-board. Furthermore, allowing the
executive branch to exercise its discretion as to inflation control by
means of reducing or terminating funds for specific programs 0 3 would
place the legislative function of policy determination largely in the
hands of the chief executive.'0 4
In sum, little, if any, evidence exists to uphold the administration's
interpretation of the Employment Act of 1946. Congress, in this act,
simply did not provide the executive branch with the authorization to
control inflation through the impoundment of funds.105
C. The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970
The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970106 granted the president
101. Id. § 1022(a)(4).
102. However, this apparently has been the view taken by administration spokes-
men. See, e.g., 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 156-57 (testimony of C.W. Weinberger).
103. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra, for examples of such action by the
Nixon administration.
104. When Senator Ervin introduced anti-impoundment legislation in January, 1973,
he noted: "[impoundment provides] merely a means whereby the White House can give
effect to the social goals of its own choosing by reallocating national resources in contra-
vention of congressional dictates." 31 CONG. Q. WK. RFPT. 215 (Feb. 3, 1973). Senator
Humphrey, in a February, 1973, address, reiterated Senator Ervin's message, with par-
ticular reference to the Nixon administration:
"Policy impoundment is practiced by President Nixon.... Under policy im-
poundment, funds are withheld not to effect savings, not as directed by Congress, not
as commander in chief, but because the president unilaterally decided to impound money
for programs that are not his priorities." 54 CONG. DiG. 114 (April, 1973) (emphasis
added) (reprint of Senator Humphrey's address of February 15, 1973, at the University
of Virginia Law School).
105. Moreover, there is no real statutory conflict between the Employment Act of
1946 and the mandatory language of various appropriation acts. See note 91 supra.
106, PuB, L, No, 91-379, tit. 1, 84 Stat. 799 (1970), as amended, Put. L. No. 92-
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substantial powers over the national economy, beyond the language of
the Employment Act of 1946, stating more directly the national pol-
icy of controlling inflation, 1 ' it specifically gives the president var-
ious powers to achieve that goal, by "issu[ing] such orders . . . as he
deems appropriate . . . to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and sala-
ries .. ."'s The Nixon administration contended that impoundment
may be employed, pursuant to this act, to reduce the overall level of
federal expenditures. 109 However, in the text of the Economic Stabili-
zation Act no mention is made of the impoundment power. Moreover,
the procedures set up in the act provide the president with controls over
the private sector of the economy; 1" 0 no powers are granted to the
president to control government spending.
The scope of the language in the Economic Stabilization Act led
to a court suit, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Con-
nally,"' wherein the plaintiff union charged that the act amounted to
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. While upholding
the constitutionality of the statute, the three judge panel applied a nar-
row standard -to the interpretation of its language. Circuit Court Judge
Leventhal, writing for the court, concluded that nothing either in the
nation's past experience or in the legislative history of the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 suggested a broad conferral of presidential
power beyond the authority to impose wage-price controls." 2
Recent legislative action clarified any doubts about the congres-
sional intent within the act. Section 4 of the Economic Stabilization
Act Amendments of 1973 added the proviso that the 1970 Act shall
not be taken "to authorize or require the withholding or reservation
of any obligational authority provided by law. .. .
D. Statutory Spending Ceiling
Spending ceilings" 4 have also been claimed as a source of im-
210, 85 Stat. 743 (1971), as amended, PuB. L. No. 93-28, 87 Stat. 27 (1973).
107. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, PUB. L. No. 92-210, tit. II,
§ 202, 85 Stat. 744.
108. Id. § 203(a).
109. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 366 (prepared statement of Deputy Attorney
General Sneed).
110. PuB. L. No. 92-210, tit. II, § 203, 85 Stat. 744 (1971).
111. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
112. Id. at 747-50.
113. PuB. L. No. 93-28, 87 Stat. 27.
114. Act of Dec. 18, 1967, Pun. L. No. 90-218, §§ 201-06, 81 Stat. 662; Revenue
and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, PuR. L. No. 90-364, § 202, 82 Stat. 271; Second
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1969, PUB. L. No. 91-47, § 401, 83 Stat. 82; Second
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1970, PuB. L. No. 91-305, §§ 401, 501, 84 Stat. 405.
[Vol. 2
IMPOUNDMENT
poundment power.115 The rigidity of the ceiling, it has been argued,
puts "constraints. . . upon the President in the management of appro-
priated funds . . . limit[ing] budget outlays. . ."I" However, this
view is inconsistent with -the past history of statutory ceilings. For ex-
ample, the fiscal 1970 expenditure ceiling was expressly subject to vari-
ation should Congress appropriate more or less funds than previously
expended.1 7  In fact, President Nixon spoke of the congressional limit
as a "rubber ceiling" in the sense that "increased spending later en-
acted by Congress would be added to the ceiling and decreases taken
away.""" Yet when Congress continued to appropriate more funds
than requested, the president, referring to his "obligation under the
Constitution and the Laws" reversed his position by indicating that he
would not expend funds in excess of the original ceiling."19
Generally, Congress has applied a flexible standard to spending
ceilings, whether or not the president has acknowledged it as such.120
Careful examination of Title V of the Second Supplemental Appropri-
ation Act, 1970' 2 '-the ceiling on outlays and expenditures for fiscal
1971-tends to bear this out. The bill makes clear that the amount
stated as the ceiling "is a beginning figure, not an ending figure."' 22
Coupled with that beginning figure, which is based on the president's
initial projection of budget outlays, is a provision which provides for
the adjustment of that estimate: "whenever action, or inaction, by the
Congress on requests for appropriations and other budgetary proposals
varies from the President's recommendation . . . the limitation set
forth herein shall be correspondingly adjusted. . "' Furthermore,
"other actions" of Congress which affect budget outlays will trigger the
same automatic adjustment mechanism.' 24 In short, "the language
115. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 96 (testimony of C.W. Weinberger); 1973
Hearings, supra note 7, at 366 (statement of Deputy Attorney General Sneed).
116. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 96 (testimony of C.W. Weinberger).
117. Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1969, Pun. L. No. 91-47, tit. IV,
§ 401, 83 Stat. 82.
118. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 594, 595 (letter from President Nixon to the
House of Representatives, December 17, 1969) (quoted in Fisher memo).
119. 5 WEEKLY Comp. OF PREs. Doc. at 1142 (1969).
120. Louis Fisher, in a 1971 memo to Senator Ervin, noted: "While it is true that
Congress has established spending ceilings in recent years . . . it is also true that Con-
gress reserved for itself the right to add funds to the President's budget. In such situa-
tions the 'ceiling' is raised automatically, and the president would have no statutory ba-
sis for impounding the add-ons." 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 594-95 (Fisher
memo).
121. Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1970, PUB. L. No. 91-305, tit. V, 84
Stat. 406.
122. Id.
123. Id. at § 501(a).
124. Id.
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would operate continuously to adjust the ceiling to comport with
. . . specific Congressional actions or inactions having budgetary im-
pact."' 28 Executive contingencies also came under Title V of the 1970
Appropriation Act.' 26 The president was specifically empowered by
the act to seek supplemental relief, if unforeseen and unavoidable out-




In general, the spending ceiling acts show a consistent congres-
sional purpose to retain control of expenditures and to delegate only
a modicum of impoundment power to the chief executive. The appro-
priations committee report, which accompanied the Second Supple-
mental Appropriation Act of 1970, specifically addressed this issue:
The committee, in initiating an all-encompassing ceiling last year,
was not seeking to advance a vehicle for arbitrary broad-axe type
cutbacks that would leave to the Executive the allocation of any
spending reduction to specific agencies and programs. The whole
idea was to focus on the totality of Federal spending by putting the
control of total spending in the hands of the Congress, adjustable
only by the Congress. 28
In 1972, President Nixon urged a $250 billion spending ceiling
"without exceptions and without loopholes" to fight inflation and to
avoid higher taxes.' 29 Unlike past ceilings, the administration proposal
to fix an expenditure limit "notwithstanding the provisions of any other
law", would have empowered the president to set his own spending
priorities by allowing for the impoundment of mandatory as well as per-
missive appropriations. 180 The Senate rejected a compromise version
of this spending ceiling amid vigorous debate that the bill cut -too deeply
into congressional prerogatives.13  The Senate's unyielding attitude
geared with the president's reluctance to have any ceiling conferring
less latitude than the original conference version resulted in the bill's
defeat in a second conference.
82
125. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 567.
126. Id. § 501.
127. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 567.
128. H.R. REP. No. 1033, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1970) (emphasis in original).
129. Message from the president of the United States urging Congress to curb fed-
eral spending, H.R. Doc. No. 329, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972).
130. H.R. 16810, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(b) (1972).
131. 118 CONG. Rac. 36854 (1972). Id. at 36837, 36844, 36848-49, 36852 (re-
marks of Senators Moss, Taft, Nelson and Mondale respectively).
132. 118 CONG. RP.c. 37065 (1972). A brief summary of events follows:
The administration's version of this legislation, H.R. 16810 (see note 130 supra),
which included full authority to impound for the purpose of staying within the expendi-
ture ceiling, passed the House by a vote of 221-163, 118 CONG. REc. 34636-37 (1972).
The bill was amended on the Senate floor to provide that no program would be cut more
than ten percent and to require the same proportional reductions in all programs. Id.
at 35954. The Senate passed the amended version by a vote of 61-11. Id. at 35992,
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Congressional opposition to presidential impoundment was further
evident in a 1973 interim report by the Joint Study Committee on Bud-
get Control:
Congress rejected the President's proposal for imposing a rigid
spending ceiling for fiscal year 1973 because it would delegate to
the President the responsibility of Congress to establish spending
priorities.13
3
Thus, there is substantial evidence to indicate that the administra-
tion was not in fact being forced to choose between conflicting statutory
directives. The spending ceiling does not grant the president the is-
cretion to ignore -the mandate of recent appropriation acts.' 34 Further-
more, selective impoundment of funds by the executive branch to limit
expenditures is inconsistent with the will of Congress.
E. Public Debt Limit
The statutory limit on the public debt presents a somewhat differ-
ent situation.13 5  If Congress adds to the president's budget with-
out a commensurate raise in taxes to increase revenue, the debt limit
will be approached, affording the president a reason to impound. 86
However, Congress, in the past, has regularly enacted legislation raising
the ceiling to prevent this result. 137  It would therefore appear -that
Congress favors increased spending over maintenance of a debt ceil-
A House-Senate conference raised the percentage cut to twenty percent in each of fifty
general categories and dropped the Senate provision requiring proportional reductions.
Id. at 36520-21. In refusing to accept this version of the bill, the Senate thwarted the
president's bid for a rigid spending ceiling and thereby, a broad impoundment power.
Id. at 37065. The end result was that no expenditure ceiling was passed by Congress
for fiscal 1973. (For fiscal 1974, however, Congress set the spending ceiling at $268.7
billion. H.R. 8410, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 42 (1973).
133. H.R. REP. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973).
134. See note 48 supra, for examples of mandatory language in appropriations acts.
135. 31 U.S.C. 757(b) (1970), as temporarily amended PuB. L. No. 93-173, 87
Stat. 691. The debt ceiling, which is a limitation on the accumulated federal debt, must
be distinguished from an expenditure ceiling, which is a limitation on the amount of ob-
ligation the federal government may incur in any one fiscal year.
136. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 594-96 (Fisher memo).
137. The following chart sets forth the rate of increase in the public debt over the
period 1941-1972.
See also S. REP. No. 1292, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972). For a summary of the history
of debt ceiling legislation, see 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 957-78 (1971); see also
Brite, Public Debt Limits: A Brief History and Some Arguments For And Against It,
LPR. OF CONG. LE9. REV. SERy. NO. 73-81E (1973) at 11 and addendum (1974).
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ing, 38 and does not wish substantive programs to be sacrificed to pre-
serve a statutory limit. In fact, Secretary of -the Treasury Fowler, in
a 1967 appearance before the Senate Finance Committee, attested to
STATUTORY DEBT LIMITATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1941 TO DATE,
AND PROPOSED LIMITATION FOR THE FISCAL




Fiscal year Permanent additional Total
1941 through Feb. 18 $49_ $49
1941: Feb. 19 through June 30 _ 65 65
1942 through Mar. 27 65 65
1942: Mar. 28 through June 30 125. --- 125
1943 through Apr. 10 125 125
1943: Apr. 11 through June 30 210 -- 210
1944 through June 8 210 210
1944: June 9 through June 30 - 260 - 260
1945 through Apr. 2 260 - 260
1945: Apr. 3 through June 30 - 300 300
1946 through June 25 - 300 - - 300
1946: June 26 through June 30 -- 275 - -- 275
1947-54 275 _ 275
1955 through Aug. 27 275_.___ 275
1955: Aug. 28 through June 30 _ 275 $6 281
1956 275 6 281
1957 275 3 278
1958 through Feb. 25 275 275
1958: Feb. 26 through June 30 275 5 280
1959 through Sept. 1 275 5 280
1959: Sept. 2 through June 29 283 5 288
1959: June 30 285 5 290
1960 285 10 295
1961 285 8 293
1962 through Mar. 12 285 13 298
1962: Mar. 13 through June 30 -- 285 15 300
1963 through Mar. 31 285 23 308
1963: Apr. 1 through May 28 285 20 305
1963: May 29 through June 30 _ 285 22 307
1964 through Nov. 30 285 24 309
1964: Dec. 1 through June 28 __ 285 30 315
1964: June 29 and 30 285 39 324
1965 285 39 324
1965 285 43 328
1967 through Mar. 1 - 285 45 330
1967: Mar. 2 through June 30 - - 285 51 336
19681 358._- 358
1969 through Apr. 61 358 7 365
1969 after Apr. 61 358 --- 358
1970 through June 301 365 12 377
1971 through June 301 380 15 395
Later years 380_ 380
Proposed:
from enactment
through June 30, 19721 _ 400 30 430
After June 30, 19721 400__ - 400
1 Includes FNMA participation certificates issued in fiscal year 1968.
Source: 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 958 (1971).
138. Presidents also have placed budgetary expansion before obedience to the debt
limit. The 1973 hearings have shown that even in most recent times the chief executive
has petitioned Congress to raise the debt ceiling:
Senator Chiles: The Administration did not concern itself in 1970 in its spend-
ing so that it felt that it had to impound some funds, it simply went to the
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the general lack of concern with the implementation of a rigid debt
ceiling: "[ilt has been very clearly demonstrated that during recent years
. . .[the public debt limit] has proved to have no effect on either the
actions of the Congress or the action of the Executive in the spending
field."'
3 9
If it is necessary, however, the president has at his disposal various
alternatives to impoundment so as not to exceed the debt ceiling. Con-
tingency funding represents one such expedient. Since future events
cannot be anticipated with any great precision, Congress has provided
special funds to cover contingencies and emergencies.' 40 The tapping
of these resources has become a well-established practice. 4' Al-
though the bulk of contingency funding cases indicate a purpose other
than curbing the rising public debt, Congress has nonetheless recog-
nized that they could serve this end.'42 Across-the-board expenditure
cuts provide another means by which the administration can avoid
piercing the debt ceiling.' 4 3  By requiring proportional reductions in
program funding, expenditure outlays could be decreased. At the
same time, spending priority determination would largely be left to
congressional prerogative.
The basic difficulty with these two approaches is that 'they are
Congress and asked that they increase the debt ceiling. Did they not do that
in 1971?
Mr. Sneed: Yes, sir; my recollection is that they did, and I daresay they will
again this year of necessity.
Senator Chiles: So they did not feel they were violating a sacred law in that
instance by the fact they might be spending beyond [the statutory debt ceiling]
-they are now citing that is the reason they struck out a number of these pro-
grams?
1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 378 (emphasis added) (testimony of Deputy Attorney
General Sneed).
Clearly, the Nixon administration selectively interpreted the public debt ceiling in
applying the rigidity test.
139. Hearings on H.R. 10867 Before the Senate Finance Comm. 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 30 (1967).
140. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 683, 685 (reprint of article by Louis
Fisher, Presidential Spending Discretion and Congressional Controls, (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Fisher article). The treasury department, when it determines the present
and future public debt, is authorized to include a cash reserve of $6 billion and a margin
for contingencies of $3 billion. S. REP. No. 1292, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1972).
141. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 683, 685 (Fisher article). The utilization
of contingency and emergency funding has become widespread, especially since World
War IT. To cite a few examples in past administrations: President Kennedy financed
the Peace Corps program for seven months in 1961 through the use of $1 million from
contingency funds-until such time as Congress appropriated monies. Id. at 686. In
1965, Johnson decided to increase the American fighting force in Vietnam; the funds
he expended came from a $1.7 billion emergency fund. IM at 685.
142. See S. REP. No. 249, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1973).
143. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 860, 865-66 (reprint of Louis Fisher memo
to Senator Stevenson: Congressional Remedies for Impoundment of Funds).
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short-term solutions. However, taking into account the continuous rise
of the public debt,144 contingency funding and across-the-board per-
centage cuts can be considered no less effective alternatives than im-
poundment 146 in delaying the inevitable. Consequently, the argument
that the administration is required to impound to meet the restrictions
set by -the debt ceiling 46 loses much of its force.
The duty of the president to "faithfully execute" all the laws has
been cited by the administration as a justification for impoundment.' 41
A number of difficulties appear in this reasoning. First, the theory is
predicated upon the notion that a real conflict exists between mandated
appropriation acts and the statutory authority claimed by the president.
Closer examination, however, reveals that the conflict is more apparent
144. See note 137 supra on rate of debt increase. In December, 1973, Congress
raised the statutory debt ceiling from $465 billion to $475.7 billion. Act of December
3, 1973, PuB. L. No. 93-173, 87 Stat. 691. When this limitation expired on June 30,
1974, Congress passed a further extension to the debt ceiling, raising it to $495 billion.
This new "temporary" limit expires March 31, 1975. Act of June 30, 1974, PUB. L.
No. 93-325, 88 Stat. 285.
145. In fact, the ever-increasing public debt is not the only reason to question the
rationale for recent impoundments. Indeed, one of the programs whose funds were cut,
specifically in order to keep the debt from rising, could have had no conceivable impact
on the existing debt. On February 5, 1973, the OMB announced that it had impounded
$210 million from the Rural Environmental Assistance Program (REAP). 38 Fed. Reg.
3474, 3478 (1973). The object subject to impoundment was contract authority-the
statutory grant of permission to sign contracts for work to be performed. The releasing
or withholding of contract authority has no effect on the debt until the contracts are
liquidated-the obligations paid off-after the work has been partially or completely
performed. See Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1974, 314-24
(1973). No money leaves the treasury for REAP until Congress appropriates funds to
liquidate previously obligated contracts. Cf. 16 U.S.C. §§ 590g-o, 590p(a), 590q
(1970). The contracts in question would have been liquidated by an appropriation for
fiscal 1974; and REAP could not have had any possible on the national debt until that
appropriation was passed.
146. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 366-67 (statement of Deputy Attorney
General Sneed); 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 96 (testimony of C. W. Weinberger).
Aside from these statements before congressional committees, however, the administra-
tion has not relied upon the fear of piercing the debt ceiling in its defense of executive
impoundment. See Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1974, 7-14
(1973).
147. Compare with the conclusions reached by the special counsel to President
Eisenhower in a letter, August 12, 1955, to a member of Congress:
"Because of the President's Constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the laws,
I am strongly of the view that when Congress has appropriated funds for a particular
project, that President caunot set aside the will of Congress and direct that no funds be
spent on that project. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 338-339 (reprint of memoran-
dum to the president: Authority to Reduce Expenditures, written by the Bureau of the
Budget, October, 1961) (the 1955 letter is quoted therein). In addition, the views taken




than real. The dispute is over spending priorities' 44--policy-making
responsibility specifically delegated by the Constitution to the legisla-
tive branch.149  Second, the statutes relied upon by the administration
neither individually nor collectively support the impoundment practice.
The economies and contingencies contemplated under the Antidefi-
ciency Act provide no broad grant of spending discretion to the execu-
tive. Similarly, the Employment Act of 1946 and the Economic Stabili-
zation Act of 1970 carefully circumscribe their respective functions: In
the Employment Act of 1946 the president's control over policy is lim-
ited to the making of "such recommendations for legislation as he may
deem necessary or desirable"; 150 the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, as amended in 1971, sets up executive controls over the private
sector of the economy to "stabilize prices, rents, wages and sala-
ries"' 51-- the only reference to impoundment is in a 1973 amendment
to the act which stated it to be contrary to congressional intent.152
Moreover, the legislative histories of the statutory spending and debt
ceilings indicated a consistent purpose: the subordination of rigid ex-
penditure limits to the continued maintenance of congressionally-
authorized programs. Third, it would be within the power of Congress
to take away the executive authority asserted, either through outright
repeal of conflicting acts or the amendment of them. Taken together,
these observations underline the inadequacy of the statutory arguments
for impoundment.
MI. The General Intent of Appropriation Acts
A necessary element of the impoundment arguments is that an ap-
propriation bill is intended merely as an authorization to spend and that
a bill does no more than place an absolute ceiling on expenditures,
leaving ultimate distribution decisions to executive judgment. 5 3 Al-
148. See H.R. REP. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973) (report of the Joint Study
Committee on Budget Control). Senator Humphrey noted on January 12, 1973: "Im-
poundments are being made deliberately to thwart the authorization and appropriations
priorities set by Congress in law." 31 CONG. Q. WK. REPT. 215 (Feb. 3, 1973).
Thereby, former Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist's standards for conflicting statu-
tory demands fall short: "the conflict must be real and imminent for this argument to
have validity; it would not be enough that the President disagreed with spending estab-
lished by Congress." 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, 279, 284.
149. See U.S. CoNsr. art. L § 1.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(4) (1970).
151. PuB. L. No. 92-210, tit. II, § 203(a), 85 Stat. 743.
152. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, PuB. L. No. 93-28, § 4,
87 Stat. 27.
153. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 94 (testimony of C.W. Weinberger); 1973
Hearings, supra note 7, at 367-68 (prepared statement of Deputy Attorney General
Sneed).
Further support for this position can be found in a February, 1967, memorandum
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though some support for this theory is found in early practice under
the Constitution, 154 the general trend of congressional action represents
a desire to retain control of the purse.155
by Acting Attorney General Clark to the secretary of transportation. Clark argued that
"[tihe courts have recognized that appropriation acts are of a fiscal and permissive na-
ture and do not in themselves impose upon the executive branch an affirmative duty to
expend the funds." 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 872, 874 (reprint of opinion of Act-
ing Attorney General Clark). The following cases were cited in the opinion: McKay v.
Central El. Power Coop., 223 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Lovett v. United States, 66
F. Supp. 142 (1945), aff'd on other grounds, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Campagna v. United
States, 26 Ct. Cl. 316 (1891); and Hukill v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 562, 565 (1881).
Upon analysis, these decisions are not authority for the position advanced. In fact,
Hukill, a suit by a mail carrier to recover for mail transportation services before the
Civil War, contains a statement directly contrary: "Every appropriation for the pay-
ment of a particular demand, or class of demands, necessarily involves and includes the
recognition by Congress of the legality and justice of each demand, and is equivalent
to an express mandate to the Treasury officers to pay it." 16 CL Cl. at 565 (emphasis
added). The language favored by Acting Attorney General Clark states that "[ain ap-
propriation . . . is not a designation of any particular pile of coin or roll of notes to
be set aside.., but is simply a legal authority to apply so much of any money in the
Treasury to the indicated object." 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 872, 874. Accepting
this, it does not follow that the executive has discretion regarding the effectuation of
the indicated object. Moreover, the case actually turned on questions unrelated to the
impoundment issue, i.e., whether the claim in question had been p~eviously paid by the
Confederacy. Compagna involved the issue of whether an appropriation to pay a group
of musicians at a certain rate should be controlling in the face of a statute which fixed
their compensation at a lower rate. The court concluded that the appropriation was con-
tingent or variable, and that therefore, the excess amount over the statutory figure was
to provide for contingencies-not to alter the pay scale. In its decision, the court did note
that "[alan appropriation is per se nothing more than the legislative authorization pre-
scribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury," 26 Ct. Cl.
at 317; however, in light of the facts of the case, it is difficult to perceive how this single
sentence can support the broad proposition that an appropriation poses no duty on the
executive to expend funds. Lovett and McKay, the other two cases cited, present a to-
tally different issue, i.e., whether the courts can require certain payments to be made
despite evidence of contrary legislative intent. Three Supreme Court cases not referred
to by Acting Attorney General Clark indicate that when Congress makes an appropria-
tion in terms which constitute a direction to pay, the office of the treasury cannot re-
fuse to make payment. See United States v. Louisville, 169 U.S. 249 (1898); United
States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885); United States v. Jordan, 113 U.S. 418 (1885).
See notes, and text accompanying notes, 31-32 supra.
154. E. CoRwIN, Tim PRESIDENT: OFrcn AND Powas, 1787-1957, 127-30 (1957).
Early appropriation bills authorized unqualified sums of money and left to executive dis-
cretion the specific items and persons the money ultimately would reach. Id. at 127-
28. Moreover, Louis Fisher writes: "Lump-sum appropriations became particularly no-
ticeable during emergency periods of war and national depression. During the Civil
War, an act provided for $50 million to pay two- and three-year volunteers; $26 million
for subsistence; another $14 million to cover transportation and supplies; and $76 mil-
lion for an assortment of items, to be divided among them 'as the exigencies of the ser-
vice may require. . . ."' 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 683, 684 (Fisher article).
155. The courts have recognized this desire to retain control of the purse, through
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Admittedly, there is little dispute with the spending power of the
executive in a case where Congress has clearly intended the appropri-
ation to be permissive. 156 In a similar vein, it is recognized that
strongly-worded legislation can mandate spending. 15 7  The majority of
statutes, however, do not involve such extreme positions; a question
thus arises as to the amount of discretion provided the president in this
"twilight zone". Accordingly, standards must be established to evalu-
ate middle-range impoundments.
Former Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, testifying before
the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers in March, 1971, in-
dicated certain guidelines which could be followed in the interpretation
of a given appropriation act: "taking the overall language of the au-
thorization bill, the enabling statute if there was one in the particular
appropriations language, and construing them together to try to find...
a reasonable basis. .... Moreover, the courts have evolved a body
of doctrine to aid in statutory construction, the cardinal rule of which
is "to give effect to the intent of Congress."'t 59 Therefore, the justifi-
cation for a given impoundment is contingent upon the consistency of
the executive action with congressional purpose.
The determination of statutory intent is decidedly a judicial func-
tion.'60 With respect to appropriation acts, the courts have held that
where Congress imposes conditions upon the expenditure of funds, the
their statutory interpretation of congressional intent in the recent impoundment cases.
See, e.g., text accompanying notes 160-75 infra. Moreover, by employing clearly de-
fined language in its appropriation acts, Congress has taken steps to reassert itself and
re-establish its power over the purse. See note 48 supra.
156. Two examples of permissive statutory language: Department of Transportation
and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Put. L. No. 92-398, tit. I, 86 Stat. 580, pro-
vides "[flor necessary expenses of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, includ-
ing not to exceed $27,000 for allocation within the Department for official reception
and representation expenses as the Secretary may determine. . . ." (emphasis added).
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly grants the president the power to
withhold funds from federally financed programs in which discrimination by race, color,
or national origin exists. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
157. Deputy Attorney General Sneed, as spokesman for the Nixon administration
on the subject of impoundment, accepted this view. See 1937 Hearings, supra note 7,
at 368 (prepared statement of Deputy Attorney General Sneed). For examples of man-
datory language in statutes, see note 48 supra.
158. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 234 (prepared statement of William H. Rehn-
quist).
159. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940). See
also Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386 (1948); Miguel v. McCarl, 291
U.S. 442 (1934).
160. Woods v. Benson Hotel Corp., 177 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cir., 1949). That is,
the reviewing court's construction of a statute will prevail over the executive's interpreta-
tion. Id. at 546.
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president has no discretion to ignore those conditions.1"' Spaulding v.
Douglas Aircraft Co. illustrates this principle:
The purpose of the appropriations, the terms and conditions under
which said appropriations were made, is a matter solely in the
hands of Congress and it is the plain and explicit duty of the execu-
tive branch of the government to comply with the same. 162
Furthermore, the courts have applied the 'consistency with con-
gressional purpose' standard to the recent impoundment cases.'63 In
State Highway Commission of Missouri v. Volpe,16 4 the court of ap-
peals, in affirming the lower court's ruling, 65 singled out the issue of
statutory construction: "The issue before us is not whether the Secre-
tary [of Transportation] abused his discretion in imposing contract con-
trols but whether the Secretary has been delegated any discretion to
so act in the first place."' 16 In finding the impoundment of highway
funds illegal, the court noted:
The claim that a general appropriation act is deemed permissive
in nature as far as it constitutes a mandate to expend funds has
not escaped criticism. Nevertheless, assuming the proposition to
be true, it still does not provide a bottom on which to premise either
a direct or implied authorization within the Federal-Aid Highway
Act to administer contract controls. For although a general appro-
priation act may be viewed as not providing a specific mandate to
expend all of the funds appropriated, this does not a fortiori en-
dow the Secretary with the authority to use unfettered discretion
as to when and how the monies may be used. The Act circum-
scribes that discretion and only an analysis of the statute itself can
dictate the latitude of the questioned discretion.167
Judge Jones, in Local 2677, The American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees v. Phillips,68 held unlawful the dismantlement of the
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO); in performing this function,
OEO Director Phillips was exceeding his statutory authority. 6 9 "The
OEO director has been granted discretion in the disbursing of funds
161. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127, 129 (1940); Rhodes v.
Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 422 (1898).
162. Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. 985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945),
al'd, 154 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1946). But see note 147 supra.
163. See note 62 supra.
164. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
165. State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972). The
circuit court affirmed the injunction and declaratory judgment issued by the district
court against the secretary of transportation, but vacated, because of mootness, the lower
court's issuance of a writ of mandamus. State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d
at 1118.
166. Id. at 1106-07.
167. Id. at 1109 (emphasis added).
168. 358 F. Supp. 60, 83 (D.D.C, 1973).
169. Id. 4t 67,
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so as to effectuate the goals of the program. . . . But discretion in
the implementation of a program is not the freedom to ignore the stand-
ards for its implementation.'7 0
Finally, in the case of Berends v. Butz,171 the secretary of agri-
culture was directed to reinstate emergency loans to farmers. After
examining the legislative history of the relevant statutes, the court con-
cluded:
It is clear.., that Congress has directed the Secretary to accept
and consider loan applications from those counties which have been
designated as "emergency loan areas." The Secretary's refusal to
comply with the statutory language, and the subsequent termina-
tion of the emergency loan program was accomplished in excess of
the Secretary's authority .... 172
The president and the various executive agencies, it would seem,
have some discretion173 as to the allocation of funds in the statutory
"twilight zone"; but clearly not enough to abuse the purpose Congress
intended by law. It is necessary to distinguish between savings ef-
fected by more efficient performance of a function, 74 and im-
poundments made by curtailment of a service or omission of a project.
In the former case, the executive is within his constitutionally and legis-
latively defined bounds, consistent with congressional intent. In the
latter, he has exceeded the legal authorization provided him, by ignor-
ing the substantive issue of law: the purpose for which the act was
enacted. As the courts have maintained, an appropriation statute need




The recent exercises of impoundment appear to be seriously lack-
ing in justification. No constitutional power to impound resides
in the executive. Little merit can be found for the proposition
that the president's duty to faithfully execute the laws provides for their
nonexecution. With respect to the lawmaking powers of the president,
as the court held in Youngstown, they are limited to "the recommend-
ing of laws he thinks wise and -the vetoing of laws he thinks bad."1 7
170. Id. at 77 (emphasis added). See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971).
171. 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973).
172. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
173. The scope of executive discretion is dependent upon the language of a specific
statute.
174. That is, pursuant to the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 665 (1970), as
amended, Pun. L. No. 93-344, fit. X, 88 Stat. 332.
175. See generally note 62 supra.
176. Youngstow4 Sheet & T.bi CO, v, $4wyer, 343 TT,S. 579, 587 (1952),
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Nor is the veto power an absolute one-the founding fathers circum-
scribed the power of the chief executive to preclude the effectuation
of national legislation. The statutory arguments are equally unconvinc-
ing. The Antideficiency Act, the Employment Act of 1946, and the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, all fall far short of granting the
president broad spending discretion. Similarly, the expenditure ceiling
and debt limit do not measure up to the criterion of rigidness. Finally,
the "consistency with congressional purpose" standard, as applied by
the courts to the general appropriation acts, contravenes the assertion
that the expenditure of funds is an executive function.
Clearly, the president's authority to act "must stem either from an
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."'1 7 However, in the
current case for impoundment, neither claim can be made.
Postscript:
As this issue goes to press, the Supreme Court decided the consoli-
dated cases of Train v. City of New York (No. 73-1377) (Feb. 18,
1975) and Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. (No. 73-1378)
(Feb. 18, 1975) (N. Y. Times Feb. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 8) (see note 62,
supra, for case histories).
In a unanimous decision the Court held that the administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency has no authority under the 1972
amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to spend less
than the full amount appropriated by Congress.
I Relying exclusively on the legislative history of the act, the Court
did not reach the constitutional issue of whether the president has in-
herent authority to refuse to spend funds appropriated by Congress.
177. Id. at 585.
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